Seventy years ago today, the Foreign Minsters of Russia and Germany singed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which neutralised Russia at the start of World War II. According to Radio Free Europe the pact “gave Germany a free hand to attack Western Europe without having to fear a war on two fronts. In return, its secret protocol consigned Finland, Estonia, Latvia, the Romanian territory of Bessarabia, and a little later Lithuania, to the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. Poland was partitioned between Germany and the USSR.” For these people, as Historian Orlando Figges says, “the pact began the reign of terror, mass deportations, slavery and murder”. Though the Pact was broken with the invasion of the USSR by Germany in 1941, it is notable that except for Poland and Finland, these territories remained part of the USSR until 1989. Until this year the USSR even denied the existence of the shameful secret protocol which divided these independent democratic countries between the 2 powers.
The Pact is still painfully relevant. As Figges says the Pact remains “a constant thorn in Russia’s relations with neighbouring European states”, as Russia has shown repeatedly, and most recently in Georgia & Ukraine, that the Soviet notion of sphere of influence is very much alive in Russia’s foreign policy.
Last April the European Parliament called for “the proclamation of 23 August as a Europe-wide Remembrance Day for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, to be commemorated with dignity and impartiality”. For those European countries who still deal with the effects of totalitarianism on their country and their families, the 23 of August is a day that will remain in their hearts for all the wrong reasons.
Leonhard Lapin: Molotov-Ribbentrop - The uneasy alliance of hammer & sickle and swastika
On May 29th the French Assemblée Nationale took a vote that might have profound impact on whether Turkey joins the European Union in a few years, or not. Making good on what his predecessor Jacques Chirac had promised all along, President Sarkozy and his ruling UMP party introduced a constitutional amendment, which would put future enlargements to include more populous countries - notably, of course, the extension of the Union to Turkey - to a popular vote in France. The Turkish government has 
Wolfgang Ischinger
For France the object of being a driving force in the European Union - as part of the Franco-German tandem - was often ascribed to its desire to continue the self-aggrandizing politicking of “la grande nation” through different means. As the only European nuclear “super power,” the ‘other’ large European power, Germany, rarely had a problem conceding big brother status to France. The partnership has seen its share of vivid imagery borrowed from the world of transportation - the tandem, the motor, the driving force of European integration. Irrespective of personal differences throughout history (Schmidt and Giscard didn't start out as friends, and Chirac and Schroeder could surely have been more chaleureux) the unwritten rules in European policy making for “the big two” dictated that major advances from either side be checked with the partner on the other side of the Rhein first. All this was surely true until the conclusion of the Nice Treaty negotiations, when Jacques Chirac's demanding behaviour irked more than just the Germans. While the rift was felt then, the introduction of new players into the constellation (the Weimar triangle, including Poland for one) and the practical bargaining games around a larger table have seemingly let the air out of the tandem's tires.
