EU at 50

On May 29th the French Assemblée Nationale took a vote that might have profound impact on whether Turkey joins the European Union in a few years, or not. Making good on what his predecessor Jacques Chirac had promised all along, President Sarkozy and his ruling UMP party introduced a constitutional amendment, which would put future enlargements to include more populous countries - notably, of course, the extension of the Union to Turkey - to a popular vote in France. The Turkish government has been quick to criticize the move as discriminatory, as the amendment only demands a referendum for country’s that in size would represent 5% of the EU total population. Thus, such a vote would only be needed for Turkey and Ukraine, the most contested of the current candidates. The move is surely to put a hostile spin on the membership negotiations, which will be led by France once that country takes over the rotating Presidency of the European Council on July 1. Already, tensions have been rising between the two sides, with plenty of finger-pointing as to which side is responsible for the slow pace of negotiations on the so-called chapters, which define the necessary reform steps toward accession.

A referendum in France against the accession could force the hand of the government (handing the responsibility over to the people might allow the then-government to save face toward their Head-of-State counterparts, while playing the popular democratic card) to vote ‘No’ in the Council. As the enlargement of the Union requires unanimity in the Council, and depending on the pro and con campaigns once Turkey’s membership comes up for the vote, this could mean the end of the country’s hopes toward becoming one of the largest and most populous in the Union.

Wolfgang Ischinger, the designated head of the Munich Security Conference, former German Ambassador to the US currently serving as his country’s top diplomat in the UK, has published an article in the Financial Times arguing that now - not after the US elections - is the time to forge stronger transatlantic ties. A rare opportunity is emerging to set the agenda on future EU-US relations due to the confluence of two key events in 2009: the inauguration of a new US President and the entry into force of the Lisbon Reform Treaty. Each of these events will give both sides new figureheads, as the new EU Treaty foresees the creation of a permanent presidency (for a two-and-a-half year term) of the 27-member bloc (see my earlier entry on this issue). The hope is, of course, that a high-profile figure will at least superficially solve the age-old question attributed to Henry Kissinger: “Who do I call when I want to talk to Europe?”

Ties between the allies have been tenuous at best throughout the two-term Bush Presidency. The Iraq war drove a stake through the heart of the Union, with Spain and the UK deploying troops and Germany and France fronting the anti-invasion coalition. During the first Bush administration the two regular semi-annual US-EU Summits were cut to one, further reducing necessary ‘face time’ between diplomats on both sides.

Thus, while the second term of the Bush administration has been about ironing out diplomatic creases between the US and European allies, the relationship could surely be more productive in light of the global challenges: instability in Iraq and Afghanistan, a volatile situation throughout the Middle East, natural catastrophes caused by global warming, instability on the world financial markets.

Aside from the future EU President who won’t take office before 2009, it will be up to Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the country most critical of US military plans for Iraq (the decision which prompted the American side to begin consuming “Freedom Fries” and dismissing the French as “Cheese-eating surrender monkeys”) to forge closer ties as the issues the EU should begin to tackle now - not later- to prove to the US that the bloc is serious about reaffirming its commitment to transatantic relations.

In the piece, Ischinger argues that Europe must enhance its military engagement around the world, by building the kind of military capacity necessary in a world of modern conflict. Implicitly, he is criticizing the work of the European Defence Agency, designed precisely for the purpose of finding more functional solutions toward crisis prevention while coordinating the actual military capabilities (i.e. the coordination of weapons development and procurement) of the EU Member States. Granted, the EDF, which has been around a mere three years has a difficult and challenging role, particularly since it is not designed to produce short-term effects, but rather create a coordination mechanism, which will facilitate and accelerate a European response to certain situations. This will take time, but it is a major improvement to the intergovernmental mess that was European Security and Defence Policy after the Amsterdam Treaty. To not mention it, is to ignore its important contribution to long-term improved relations with both the US and with NATO.

Which brings us to Ischinger’s second point: The EU and US must resolve questions on the future of NATO. Just how difficult this will be is evidenced by the NATO Summit in Bucharest earlier this month. How Europe is to offer a solution to that situation in a matter of months is still somewhat a mystery to me, given the tight-rope walk that was the last summit. Certainly, however, the US has got to stop offering membership to countries that counteract certain priorities of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Closer coordination between the EU members of NATO and the US is thus undoubtedly needed.

Ischinger also wants to see the EU pull the US over to its side with respect to robust plans toward reducing the harmful effects of global warming and reaffirming the “western” values, which dismiss torture and advocate dialogue in addressing the issue of radical Islam and terrorism. Here Ischinger is undoubtedly right - the EU is one of the leading players in the actual reduction of green-house gases and has businesses which have clearly seen the light with respect to their competitive advantage. Going green is becoming a huge future business sector for Europe, and that is an angle, which could be played in discussions in which the US has continually pointed to the negative business effects of increased environmental legislation.

Europe and the US could profit immensely from a closer exchange of experience not solely on intelligence and security information with respect to the global spread of terrorism (this is already onoing), but means of reaching out to communities most likely to become subjected to radical Islam and its negative consequences. Transatlantic dialogue on this issue must be stepped up on all levels - government and non-government.

For more on Ischinger’s views on the future of the EU-US relationship and Russia’s role in the world, you can watch an interview with the Financial Times’ foreign affairs editor Quentin Peel here.

The FPA recently spoke to Serbia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Pavle Jevremovic, on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.  Jevremovic discusses the impact the reaction by Serbia might have on negotiations for his country’s EU membership bid, as well as the role of Russia and the U.S.

 Update (March 4, 20 Der Spiegel is reporting that the “cold snap” between the Franco-German partners is thawing, following a “constructive” meeting in which President Sarkozy agreed to a compromise to extend negotiations on a future Mediterranean Union to all 27 EU Member States, not just bordering countries. Quoting the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung the Spiegel notes that Chancellor Merkel’s misgivings stemmed not so much from German concerns over the issue, but rather her European perspective of the proposed bloc, which is to closely cooperate on issues pertaining to border security, immigration and Mideast peace. Merkel wants to see the Union built upon the already existing Barcelona Process.

Though both leaders were quick to underline their willingness to compromise and work together on key issues in their joint Hanover statement on March 3rd, the necessity to stress a collaborative mindset alone is an indication that not all is well in the Franco-German tandem.

For France the object of being a driving force in the European Union - as part of the Franco-German tandem - was often ascribed to its desire to continue the self-aggrandizing politicking of “la grande nation” through different means. As the only European nuclear “super power,” the ‘other’ large European power, Germany, rarely had a problem conceding big brother status to France. The partnership has seen its share of vivid imagery borrowed from the world of transportation - the tandem, the motor, the driving force of European integration. Irrespective of personal differences throughout history (Schmidt and Giscard didn’t start out as friends, and Chirac and Schroeder could surely have been more chaleureux) the unwritten rules in European policy making for “the big two” dictated that major advances from either side be checked with the partner on the other side of the Rhein first. All this was surely true until the conclusion of the Nice Treaty negotiations, when Jacques Chirac’s demanding behaviour irked more than just the Germans. While the rift was felt then, the introduction of new players into the constellation (the Weimar triangle, including Poland for one) and the practical bargaining games around a larger table have seemingly let the air out of the tandem’s tires.

Cracks in the veneer began to show around the negotiations for a Constitution for Europe, but tensions sparked over the Turkey question with the last German government, who favored Turkish accession to the Union. While current governments in both country’s are thinking more along the same lines with respect to a further enlargement round to include the big man on the Bosperus, France’s newest advance across it’s bordering waters is raising a few eyebrows in Germany.

In its February 21st edition, The Economist, chronicles the fate of President Sarkozy’s next big idea: the Mediterranean Union. The launch of this ‘grand projet‘ is to fall squarely into the French EU presidency, which starts in the summer, and is intended to tackle non-ideological issues, such as transport, sea safety and to a certain degree border control and immigration. All well, all good, except for ‘la grande question’: Why? EU bordering countries have been closely bound to the Union through the Barcelona Process and the European Neighborhood Policy, thus other EU member states are having a hard time reading Mr. Sarkozy’s project as little more than a prestige object.

Most concerned, according to the Economist are - yes, the Germans:

“Not only did the new union seem devised to exclude them but its relation to the EU has been muddled. At first, the French did not see it as an EU matter. But this, viewed from Berlin, looked like an aggressive move to launch a rival body without following the cherished tradition of Franco-German co-operation. Now that the French have made the launch of the project a quasi-EU event, there is a new concern: finance. Dark voices in Berlin worry that Mr Sarkozy may try to use EU money to take the political credit for projects on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, home to several ex-French colonies.“

Does make you wonder, though, doesn’t it? Whom exactly is Mr. Sarkozy aiming to please?

Even more suspicious to the Germans - Sarkozy is veiling his argumentation in favor of his Mediterranean Union plans in terms of the fabled “avant garde” - essentially the provisions in the new Lisbon Treaty that allow certain countries to move ahead on certain policy areas, paving the way for the much critiqued two-speed Europe (which, to a certain extent already exists through the exemptions of the UK and Denmark on certain social protocols, and in another form in the close cooperation on defence matters among other groups of member states). “Those who want to proceed must be able to do so together,” declared Mr Sarkozy, using a line more commonly deployed by EU enthusiasts against Britain, “but those who don’t want to must not stop the others from moving forward,” the Economist quotes Sarkozy as saying. Needless to say, perhaps, the Germans are not invited to the July 13th meeting, in which he plans to unveil his blueprint for the Mediterranean Union. I have a feeling, a little touch of motor oil will not be enough to keep the Franco-German motor humming, having hit yet another road block.

Additional background information can be found here, here and here.