Though the Financial Times predicts the advent of ‘health tourism’ , Mrs. Vassiliou argues that effects would actually be beneficial:

“Every country is very eager to spend money on everything because there is a demand from their citizens. Gradually they will realise they cannot have everything. It is better to specialise in certain things and rely on your neighbour for something else and vice versa. There will be this pooling together of expertise and knowledge.”

She also dismisses ideas of health care ’stop ‘n shop’:

“Few patients take up their right. By giving them more information it would open the option up beyond the rich who can already afford to travel, she said. “Ninety per cent of people prefer to stay at home where they know the language and the system,” she said.

But now? Now that the Lisbon Reform Treaty lies all but in tatters? Now could really be your time to shine, M. le President. Instead,  you are already isolating and rebuking people left and right, be it the Commission President, the Union’s trade Commissioner or the Czech President. What a way to show everyone who’s boss..

How will the Irish ‘No’ affect your turn at the helm of the Union? Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform argues that you’ll have to listen to Irish concerns and are likely to focus on negotiating exemptions for the green island. But looking ahead to all the other countries now wavering in their support for the Treaty, will it be enough? And more importantly, perhaps for you - will it make you look good? Will you still be talking to the people that matter a few months down the line? We’ll be watching…

Already the Poles are using the Irish ‘No’ as an argument against accelerating the final steps in their national ratification process. The Polish government proved particularly tough in the final stages of the negotiation toward the compromise which constitutes the Lisbon Treaty. With doubt now spreading over how best to proceed, the Polish President has said he would hold off on pushing ahead with the last step in his country’s ratification process until it was clear that the Treaty would pass in all remaining countries. Many EU Member States have had amend their Constitutions, or in Poland’s case modify laws that regulate the collaboration of the legislative and executive branches of the government.

In the UK, meanwhile, Eurosceptic millionaire Stuart Wheeler has lost his bid to force Gordon Brown’s hand in putting the Lisbon Reform Treaty to a referendum.  Although Wheeler has sworn to appeal the High Court’s judgement that the Treaty showed “nothing’’ in the claimant’s case to cast any doubt on the lawfulness of ratifying the treaty without a public vote, experts believe ratification in the UK will go ahead as planned.

In light of looming energy resource issues and a desire for stable relations with the enlarging Union’s Eastern neighbor, European officials have been hard at work crafting a ‘high-level’ discourse on issues including trade and investments with Russian counterparts.

The Lisbon Reform Treaty forsees the creation of a European Foreign Minister and a term (though permanent) European President, arguably giving other nations - to quote Henry Kissinger - a “number to call when they want to talk to Europe.” 

Instead, EU heads of state and government faced yet another “crisis,” likened by some to the “abyss” created by the negative votes on the Lisbon Treaty’s predecessor, the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty. After the referenda in France and the Netherlands, the Union’s response was to enter a “period of reflection”. The cumbersome construction of governance, which the Nice Treaty dictates doesn’t exactly allow for quick reaction, nor was it prudent at the time. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty underlined a legitimacy problem key to the entire European project: What is it all for? Citizens in two of the Union’s founding states had lost sight of the extent to which the EU benefitted their lives. Thus, leaders agreed to pare the Constitution down to its basics and focus largely on questions of governance, starting with the functioning of a 27+ - member, “ever closer Union”, not the creation of a federal super-state feared by many.

Institutional reform is a difficult platform to campaign on. My respect and admiration goes out to the Irish ‘Yes’ campaigners. Whether or not the Lisbon Reform Treaty was just not ’sexy’ enough to rally voter support, or whether it was too difficult to understand, the campaign was badly run or the ‘No’ side just had the winning arguments will be hard to determine, though analysts are already hard at work.

But what of the EU response on the weekend? Or should I say: What response? To quote the EU Council Conclusions:

“The European Council noted (emphasis added is my own) the outcome of the referendum in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty and took stock (aha!) of the situation on the basis of an initial assessment provided by the Taoiseach Brian Cowen.

The European Council agreed that more time was needed to analyse the situation. It noted that the Irish government will actively consult, both internally and with the other Member States, in order to suggest a common way forward.”

Impressive. The Council takes note - now there’s a European Union I can throw my weight behind. The European Policy Centre is far more diplomatic, when it says “In sum, the language is very cautious and no specific commitment or recommendation is made.” (The EPC also has an excellent look into the political and institutional problems ahead)

True, there is no Plan B. The Union’s true response: Lisbon or bust. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, arguably the ‘mother’ of the Lisbon Reform Treaty negotiations and the incoming President of the European Union, French President Nicolas Sarkozy reiterated this point at the Summit. Contrary to the 2003 crisis, most Member States (save the Czech Republic, whose situation is a little more tricky) are forging ahead with ratification. The implicit - and so far only legal alternative - goal could be to push Ireland into a second vote, once exceptions (on neutrality, an Irish Commissioner, etc.) have been negotiated.

At this point no other Member State is leaning toward untying a package so precariously wrapped up during the German EU Presidency. Negotiating exceptions to certain rules to accomodate the Irish, however, might reopen Pandora’s box over time. The Czech government has its issues with the Treaty and is in the midst of an appeal to the country’s Constitutional Court with respect to its compatibility. The compromise achieved with Poland was tricky. At least Italy’s Berlusconi, the new-old Prime Minister is pushing ahead with ratification in his country, lest he throw a wrench in the process simply to make a political statement.

Ireland’s ‘No’ will not ’shut down’ the Union - it will continue to do business and legislate as usual. However, aside from a possible wave of ‘exceptionalism’ noted above, the obvious delay of the entire ratification process does have implications for enlargement (the Nice Treaty provisions weren’t conceptualized for a Union beyond 27 and Croatia would be the first to feel the effects), immigration policy (the Lisbon Treaty alters the legal basis of most legislation concerning justice and home affairs) and will likely alter the tone of the election campaign for the European Parliament in 2009.

In light of this ‘No’ the European Union as a whole cannot afford to be seen as simply ‘taking stock’ and ‘noting’ current developments. Of course solutions take time to formulate, but Europe’s citizens are already confused (not least the Irish - 22% of the naysayers felt they knew too little about the Treaty) about what it all means. For all the work the Commission has poured into its ‘Plan D’ to enhance the legitimacy of the Union, we now need a functional way forward. One can thus only hope that ratification continues and any exceptions are negotiated swiftly and stable, tenable results are achieved. Only if the Council is seen to be addressing the situation adequately is there truly hope for an “ever closer Union.”

The sanctions include a freeze on the assets of one of the country’s largest banks suspected to be a major sources of the funding for Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In addition, the 27-member bloc announced it would curtail deny access to its territory to “experts” associated with the country’s suspected nuclear program and restrict financial flows to Iranian companies linked to activities that could support the development of a nuclear weapons arsenal.

It is a true Friday the 13th for the new Irish Prime Minister, Brian Cowen, who assured all those fretful in Brussels that he had done “everything possible” to get his countrymen and women to see the benefit of the treaty.

Full coverage, including a roundup of results will follow in the coming hours, but the Irish Times has a constantly updated website here. Already, however, masterminds in the French capital are scrambling for ideas for a modus operandi. France takes over the rotating EU Presidency on July 1 and the government has already vowed to taking the remaining ratification procedures in other EU member states further. Much like the dark days three years ago, following the resounding ‘NON’ and ‘NEE’ votes in France and the Netherlands, the summer EU Summit in just a week’s time will focus on how to react to what could be perceived as yet another fundamental crisis of legitimacy for the European Union.

Eyes grew wider with anguish when the Irish Times reported earlier in the week that the ‘No’ camp had overtaken the pro-Lisbon Treaty faction in the polls. What is clear is that it will be an extremely close vote.

But who are these nay-sayers that may be poised to undo an incomplete, though “best-possible-given-the-circumstances” compromise to reform and streamline the unwieldy 27 member ship that is the Union? The Guardian says it best:

“..ultra-rightwing Catholics, traditional nationalists, pro-American free marketeers and the far left. Add in a pop star and a turkey puppet called Dustin and you have a force which threatens to sink a reform project designed to transform how nearly 500 million Europeans are governed.”

As is always the case with contested votes, the undecided electorate and the overall turnout will play a disproportionate role in the final decision. Despite government efforts led by new Taoiseach Brian Cowen and supporters, 60% of the public still felt they were ill informed about the impact the Treaty would have on their lives and the status of Ireland within the Union. Unsurprisingly, then, that the eclectic ’No’ camp has preyed on these fears: Some argue that the Lisbon Treaty will allow abortion to sneak in through the back door, others are concerned about how it might affect Ireland’s corporate tax base, still others - including the only male member of pop act The Corrs - argue that signing on to the reform treaty is akin to remilitarizing one of the few remaining neutral countries in the European Union.

In a last minute publicity stunt, free-market advocating businessman Declan Ganley, who heads Libertas, the ‘No’ group that wants to see Ireland’s politicians negotiate a “better deal” for the country, bought one way tickets to Brussels for the country’s leadership, arguing they shouldn’t return unless they came back with a Commissioner and significantly more influence for the green isle (the Lisbon Reform Treaty creates a more streamlined EU executive, with rotating Commissioners, eradicating the traditional “one Commissioner per country” practice).

But honestly: What’s the worst that could happen if Ireland says no? Will it truly be the unravelling of the Union? My former colleague, EU expert and Director of Studies at the European Policy Centre, Antonio Missiroli predicts that practicality might prevail: The first option might be to organize a second referendum (this would be highly dependent on the margin of the ‘No’ camp win), the second might include a renegotiation of additional Irish opt-outs from the Treaty to satisfy skeptics and/or in the worst case (and given the amount of subsidies that Ireland still receives, no one could possibly want this solution), Ireland would pull-out of the European Union altogether.

Whether or not any of these options will have to be considered is only a matter of hours. We will feature a roundup of results and commentary in tomorrow’s blog.

Spidla points to the fact that too many German women still choose to work part-time, in jobs that are underpaid, because of the lack of opportunities for child and elderly care. Germany still largely operates as a male-driven society, where the man is the breadwinner and the woman - irrespective of her level of education or opportunities in the work force - stays home. Over the past two administrations, important changes have been made, with the introduction of increased flexibility in childcare, new forms of parental financial support, and greater emphasis on the role of employers, who are losing out on valuable labor. The prospects of demographic decline has hastened the government response to these pressing issues, but at the study proves, results are yet to be felt.

The Financial Times Deutschland (quoted in the English language version of Der Spiegel), also points out the detrimental consequences of a lack of women in the labor force in times when qualified workers are scarce and offers a European comparison:

“Regardless of the discrimination issue, it’s a problem for the economy, which is crying out for skilled employees, if women are thwarted in their careers. That’s what happens if they’re made to choose between having children and having a career. Belgium has excellent child-care provisions — and is among the countries with the lowest wage differentials between men and women in the European Union. Germany is at the other end of the scale. Silent reserves of qualified women could be used here.”

Naturally, a real solution to Germany’s skilled labor problem is a combination of utilizing existing labor resources (i.e. motivating women to return to work after childbirth by offering feasible solutions to combine both work and family) and creating a feasible, flexible labor migration system as proposed through the EU Blue Card. However, changing policies is one thing - changing mentalities is another!

Schaldemose is looking for 1 million signatories to her petition for it to have enough clout to influence nominations. Naturally, German chancellor Angela Merkel seems to be the obvious choice for one of these top posts, though in light of the weakness of her ruling coalition partner, the Social Democrats, Ms. Merkel would be a fool to drop out of national policy making in 2009 to take over a leadership role in Europe when so much remains to be accomplished at home.

In a recent article in the Financial Times, EU Commissioner Margot Wallström has put forth a number of female candidates aside from Ms. Merkel: Tarja Halonen, president of Finland, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, president of Latvia 1999-2007, Mary Robinson, president of Ireland 1990-97, Dora Bakoyannis, foreign minister of Greece, Ursula Plassnik, foreign minister of Austria, Margaret Beckett, former British foreign secretary, Emma Bonino, former Italian minister for trade and European Commissioner.

Arguably, though none of the posts in question are truly democratically representative offices, nominating at least one woman would serve as a better reflection of the Union’s actual population (more than half of it are female) - the Spanish cabinet, which includes more women than men is a case in point.

Women - not least Hillary Clinton or Margaret Thatcher - have proven they can be just as tenacious and ambitious as their male counterparts, providing it is the job they want. So perhaps Europe has to ask itself a different question altogether - and in part it is already doing it through the Lisbon Treaty: How can we make Europe’s top jobs just as attractive as an American Presidency or a prime ministerial post. The answer: Add some real power to the mix, and you’ll have top candidates of both genders vying for the opportunity.